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Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic is causing a dramatic loss of lives worldwide, challenging the sustainability
of our health care systems, threatening economic meltdown, and putting pressure on the mental health of in-
dividuals (due to social distancing and lock-downmeasures). The pandemic is also posing severe challenges to
the scientific community, with scholars under pressure to respond topolicymakers’ demands for advicedespite
the absence of adequate, trusted data. Understanding the pandemic requires fine-grained data representing
specific local conditions and the social reactions of individuals. While experts have built simulation models to
estimate disease trajectories that may be enough to guide decision-makers to formulate policy measures to
limit the epidemic, they do not cover the full behavioural and social complexity of societies under pandemic
crisis. Modelling that has such a large potential impact upon people’s lives is a great responsibility. This paper
calls on the scientific community to improve the transparency, access, and rigour of their models. It also calls
on stakeholders to improve the rapidity with which data from trusted sources are released to the community
(in a fully responsible manner). Responding to the pandemic is a stress test of our collaborative capacity and
the social/economic value of research.
Keywords: COVID-19, Pandemic Disease, Agent-Based Models, Modelling, Policy, Data
The COVID-19 Global Challenge
1.1 The news on 24 March 2020 announced that in a few weeks, the SARS-CoV-2 virus had already infected almost
390,000 persons and the associated COVID-19 disease killed more than 16,000 worldwide, with early peaks
in China, Italy, Iran, Spain, and France. One of the most shocking pictures of the outbreak in Italy was taken
during the night of 18 March 2020 in Bergamo, a rich city around 30 miles northeast of Milan: it shows a long
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queueof army trucks transportingdozensof coinsoutof townas24-hour crematoriums inBergamowereover-
whelmed. By the time you read this article, the situationwill be evenworse and the viruswill be expanding into
new places and communities, perhaps hitting the crowded places of less developed countries with devastating
impact.
1.2 In order to try to contain the contagion and avoid the collapse of their health care systems, governments are
taking draconian measures that, only a few weeks ago, might have caused a revolution. Social distancing, in-
tensive quarantine, lockdown, cancellation ofmass gathering events, and strict traic restrictions are enforced,
sometimes even to the extent of using a pervasive system of police and drones. In many countries, indus-
tries, companies, small businesses, and shops have been shut if they are not essential. This will have long-
term economic consequences, such as the failure ofmany small businesses and a decline in private investment
— consequences related to the severity of policy measures which, at the moment, do not have a defined ex-
piry date. Politicians are consulting epidemiologists, virologists, and public health experts in order to try and
make informed decisions, adapting their responses to contingencies and sometimes reconsidering decisions
announced only a few days before. Experts are increasingly featured in the public media and then under pres-
sure to predict when this disease will end to reduce panic. Massive public spending — at levels that will sub-
stantially increase deficits — have been enacted. Levels which, previously, might have caused a breakdown of
inter-state relationships with the EU. Some observers have started to blame liberal democracies for their inef-
ficiency, while praising the capacity of some authoritarian states (which they considered oppressive only a few
weeks before) to respond eectively.
1.3 The current outbreakof COVID-19 is not only causing adramatic loss of livesworldwide, challenging the sustain-
ability of our health care systems, precipitating an economicmeltdown, and putting pressure upon themental
health of individuals under quarantine and lock-downmeasures. This outbreak is also challenging the research
community, pushing scientists beyond their ‘comfort zone’ for two sorts of reason, which we now elaborate
upon.
1.4 Firstly, the need for a rapid response is largely incompatible with the ‘normal’ path of scientific progress, which
is based on complex and delicate practices of peer review, testing, and replicability. These practices have been
built over time toensure thevalidityof scientific claimsand research findings. Thesystemicnatureof theCOVID-
19 outbreak requires wide-ranging political decisions about prevention, testing, and anti-contagionmeasures.
Thesedecisions cannot be solely basedonepidemiological knowledge, because the eicacyof implementation
depends on people’s reactions, pre-existing social norms, and structural societal constraints. For instance, the
same lock-down policy aimed at reducing the number of infected elderly might have dierent eects when
implemented in a country where several generations live together and a country where elderly live alone but
are still very active in their communities, e.g. in religious or neighbourhood associations.
1.5 Tackling thechallengeof respondingwith rigorous research toacomplexglobalproblem isadiicult endeavour
even in normal times. In a crisis, the ‘default’ response is to convert/adapt existing models to the new context,
ideally by fitting it to newly available data. While this could reasonably be seen as the best way forward given
the speedwithwhich the virus is spreading, the dependency on the quality of available data and the underesti-
mation of theoretical premises and original intentions of re-used models can make this of questionable rigour
(Edmonds et al. 2019).
1.6 Respondingwith rigorous research toa complex global problem is evenmoreproblematic in timesof crisis. This
is due to: public pressure for immediate responses,misplacedexpectationsabout the roleof science,misunder-
standing about the certainty of scientific knowledge, and confusion concerning public responsibility. The same
political leaders who endorsed, without any modesty, public statements similar to the “we have had enough
of experts” (a statement by Michael Gove, who was Minister for the Cabinet Oice in the United Kingdom — a
statement he later qualified), are now turning to scientists for advice or recommendations on decisions that are
politically controversial. Public discourse makes it diicult for politicians to alter course (‘U-turn’) in the light
of new scientific evidence, even if it is to their credit that they do so. Indeed, public perceptions of science itself
are not helped by disagreements among scientists concerning the reliability of findings. Moreover, although
politicians are (or ought to be) aware that responsibility for decisions eventually lie solely with them as their
society’s elected representatives, they can seek to dodge this — blaming scientists if informed decisions turn
out to be wrong or glorifying themselves in case decisions turn out to be good.
1.7 Secondly, it is rare for any crisis to lie comfortably within the domain of a single discipline. Even if we squarely
consider the COVID-19 an epidemiological problem, our responses to it have environmental, ecological, po-
litical, socio-psychological, and economic aspects, and systemic cascading eects are able to be fully under-
stood only if multi- and interdisciplinary perspectives are considered. Integrating knowledge from all of these
disciplinary perspectives is suiciently diicult (e.g. Voinov & Shugart 2013) that integration itself should be
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a recognized specialism (Bammer 2017). We must remember that the dangers of excessive specialisation are
well-documented even in less problematic conditions (Thompson Klein 1990).
1.8 In this context, it is not surprising that agent-based modelling is under the spotlight. When policy decisions
and people’s reactions depend on perceptions of the future, and scenarios are probabilistic and largely unpre-
dictable, computer simulationmodels are seen as a viablemethod to project future states of a system frompast
ones in a non-trivialmanner. Whatwe see today inmanymedia are predictions of the exponential growth of the
number of infected persons based on equations that capture stylized populations and the distributions of their
dierent states. However, any social or behavioural scholar can spot that these projections do not consider
relevant factors of social complexity, which are intrinsically crucial to the modelled dynamics and a negligible
exogenous force. Not recognizing social complexity can undermine the credibility of findings, and thus we call
for urgent initiatives to: (1) improve the transparency and rigour of models to understand theoretical premises
and details and (2) promote data access to help contextualize and validatemodels across various levels of anal-
ysis (i.e., micro, meso, and macro). This call is even more urgent when simulation findings can rapidly aect
public policy decisions (e.g. on possible consequences of certain policy scenarios) and/or motivate individual
actions (e.g. impact upon decisions to stay at home to “flatten the curve”).
1.9 To improve the quality, impact, and appropriate use of computer simulation models in this delicate situation,
wewill in this paper, first, briefly review recent agent-basedmodels of COVID-19 to bring out their potential and
emphasize any existing explanatory gaps. While the number of publications, preprints and simulation tools
on immediate responses to COVID-19 pandemic is rapidly increasing due to the attention of scholars and public
pressure, it is important to discuss some important challenges involved and suggest counter-measures to avoid
collective mistakes. Secondly, we will reflect on the problematic interface between modelling and policy in or-
der to better understand problems related to excessive expectations about scientific knowledge arising from
a misunderstanding of the nature of science. Finally, we will suggest measures to reduce these gaps and im-
prove the relationship between science and public policy via a call for extensive collaboration between public
stakeholders and academic scholars in terms ofmodel and data sharing. The credibility of science has recently
been under attack from various communities, including anti-vaxxers, climate change deniers, creationists, flat-
earthers, fake news propagators, and conspiracy theorists but also from some philosophers and critical sociol-
ogists. While it is desirable that academic experts have greater public visibility and take a lead in public debate
by explicating the evidence, the unfolding of this pandemic carries the risk of undermining science if we do
not take the necessary precautions — for example, clarifying the boundaries and limits of presented conclu-
sions/recommendations. Science could be the scapegoat if the public is seeking someone to blame.
Potential of and Gaps in COVID-19 Agent-Based Models
2.1 Modelling in epidemiology has a venerable tradition since the 1920s, when dierential equations were used
to model the population distribution of disease spread, including susceptible, infected, and recovered/dead
pools. While this approach has helped to understand the threshold nature of epidemics and herd immunity,
suchmodels could not examine important social and behavioural factors, such as the behavioural responses of
individuals to policy measures, and the eect of heterogeneous social contacts on diusion patterns (Epstein
2009). Progresshasbeenmadesince the 1990s inmodellingepidemiologicaldiseasesespecially throughagent-
based simulations that include some important sources of population heterogeneity and explore the structure
and dynamics of transmission networks (e.g. Stroud et al. 2007; Yoneyama et al. 2012; Zhang et al. 2016; Hunter
et al. 2017). However, whenever an outbreak suddenly occurs, such as the one into which we have all been
thrusted in the lastmonth, severalmodelling problems emerge that require careful attention. These include: (1)
predicting complex outcomes when crucial data is unreliable/unavailable and theories are underdetermined;
(2) repurposing models outside their original purposes by confusing original illustrative/explanatory purposes
with prediction (see Edmonds et al. 2019); (3) ignoring good practices of model transparency and rigour either
due to the race for public/academic relevance or because of political pressures for immediate responses.
2.2 The case of the Imperial College COVID-19 model, which has contributed to reshaping the political agenda in
many countries, illustrates these challenges. Based on an adaptation of an individual-based simulation model
onH5N1 (Fergusonet al. 2005) and influenza (Fergusonet al. 2006), inmid-March, a teamof the Imperial College
published a report in which they predicted a huge number of people would die in Britain unless severe policy
measures were taken. Their results also helped to assess the eicacy of isolation, household quarantine, and
the closing of schools and universities. These results were quickly endorsed by the UK government (aer some
initial hesitation), influenced the US administration and alerted the French administration in their attempt at
trying to minimize the mortality rate in their countries due to the transmission of the global pandemic.1
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2.3 The core of the Imperial Collegemodel consists of households, schools andworkplaces that are geographically
distributed to represent thecountryunder study, traveldistancepatterns (within thecountryand international),
workplace, school and household size and other demographic data. However, the exact internals of themodel
are not described in any detail and no one has yet accessed themodel code.2 Maybe this is because themodel
waswrittenmore than 13 years ago byNeil Ferguson, the Imperial College team leader, and includes thousands
of line of undocumented code, as admitted in a recent tweet.3
2.4 Considering its impact and relevance, the Imperial College model has been criticized for various reasons: (a)
it does not enable the consideration of other policy options, (b) it does not use suicient data across dierent
contexts, while claiminggeneral findings, (c) it doesnot help tounderstand social conditions andconsequences
of measures. For instance, Shen et al. (2020) focused on (a) and explored the eicacy of strict contact tracing,
pre-emptive testing on a large scale and super-spreader events. They also focused on the model’s inability to
study the consequences of local dynamics at the micro level rather than the aggregated level of the data avail-
able, and the lack of attention to compliance dynamics, which depend on behavioural and social factors. They
concluded that the Imperial Collegemodelwas “several degrees of abstraction away fromwhat iswarranted by
the situation”. Considering the policy and predictive purposes of the Imperial College model, Colbourn (2020)
called formore context-specificmodels of the social and economic eects of lockdown and other interventions
and knock-on eects on health, including mental health and interpersonal violence, via careful empirical eval-
uation.
2.5 Unfortunately, even the available examples of more specific and empirically calibrated microsimulation mod-
els neglect important behavioural and social factors. For instance, Chang et al. (2020) proposed amicrosimula-
tion model calibrated on empirical data to inform pandemic response planning in Australia (see the origins of
AceMod-Australian Census-based Epidemic Model in Cli et al. 2018). Themodel captures average characteris-
tics of the Australian population by simulating over 24 million individuals with heterogeneous attributes (e.g.,
age, occupation, individual health characteristics) and their social context (dierent contact rates and contexts
such as households, neighbourhoods, schools, or workplaces), whose distributions are taken from the 2016
Australian census. In a similar vein, IndiaSIM from the Center for Disease Dynamics, Economics & Policy (see:
https://cddep.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/covid19.indiasim.March23-2-eK.pdf) was calibrated with data
from the 2018-2019 census data of the Indian population and available data fromChina and Italy to estimate the
force of infection, age- and gender-specific infection rates, severe infection, and case-fatality rates. However,
although better calibrated than previous models, these do not capture network eects nor people’s reactive
responses as the population states simply change via stochastic (randomized) processes determined by pa-
rameters (although the parameters derive from the data).
2.6 Independently of their specific characteristics, all of thesemodels are either weak in terms of empirical calibra-
tionor theoreticallyunderdeterminedorboth. Indeed, noneof themarebasedonexplicit, empirical/theoretical
assumptions of individual behaviour, social transmission mechanisms and social structure constraints. Not
only does this imply a very abstract conceptualisation of populations and behaviours: it alsomisses the chance
to understand people’s response to policy measures due to pre-existing behavioural attitudes, network eects
and social norms. While the lack of appropriate data on a country or region’s socio-economic structure, e.g.,
household structures or geographical clustering of population, canmake amodel’s parameter calibrationprob-
lematic, this should not be an excuse to: (a) repurposemodels that are purely illustrative or intended to provide
a theoretical exposition for predicting complex social outcomes, (b) suppress the attention to behavioural and
social factors, which are critical to estimate the eicacy of advocatedmeasures, because data are not available.
2.7 This suggests that any model must be considered depending on its purposes and has associated values and
risks for public use. Edmonds et al. (2019) listed seven modelling purposes: prediction, explanation, descrip-
tion, theoretical exposition, illustration, social learning, andanalogy. In theAppendix, we tried to consider each
of these purposeswith a view to evaluating the role the correspondingmodelsmight play in a crisis context, the
potential usefulness theymight have todecision-makers, and the risks associatedwith their use (manyofwhich
are general to all models, not just agent-basedmodels). For instance, in response to the lack of behavioural re-
alism in many of the currently used in the public debate, there has been a proliferation of examples of open
source agent-based implementations, though authors admitted that they are probably simply illustrations.4
While this tellsmore about the academic eervescence and selective attention that typically characterise emer-
gencies and outbreaks, the competitive advantage of the Imperial College model and similar models, which at
thepresent stagecannotbe seriously testedby thecommunity,makes theseeortsof uncertain value for imme-
diate responses, whereas they could be relevant for understanding long-term socio-economic consequences of
policy measures.
2.8 In short, the modelling practices that we developed in ‘normal’ times need to be reconsidered during a global
outbreak as this global event poses key modelling challenges. The first one is a COVID-19 prediction chal-
JASSS, 23(2) 10, 2020 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/23/2/10.html Doi: 10.18564/jasss.4298
lenge. Prediction of complex systems displaying all sorts of non-linearities, heterogeneities and sensitivities
is very challenging independently of the scientific method used to tackle the problem, agent-based modelling
included (Edmonds et al. 2019). We all are experiencing in real life the concepts and analogies that have made
the fortunes of complex systems theorists, such as the famous ‘butterfly eect’ in chaos theory (Mitchell 2009).
Complex systems researchers are aware that small, unnoticed events, possibly identified only in retrospect,
may generate unforeseen, large-scale consequences (Vespignani 2009). Awareness of significant limitations,
such as the nature of complexity, but also lack of data, ontological diversity, or the variety of approaches to
simulating human behaviour algorithmically, can make prediction diicult, if not impossible and oen even
undesirable (Polhill 2018; Edmonds et al. 2019).
2.9 Therefore, modelling experts strive to minimise the limitations —make their model assumptions valid with re-
spect to thenewSARS-CoV-2 virus, and their calibration rooted in themost accurate availabledata (e.g.Wuet al.
2020). However, during the current COVID-19 pandemic, accurate data suitable for complexity-friendly, agent-
basedmodels are not yet available and this inhibits agent-basedmodellers’ ability to produce amuch-needed,
rapid response. At the same time, other scientific communities make bolder claims, even though the same or
similar limitations apply to their methods. In late November/early December 2019, when the SARS-CoV-2 virus
probably emerged (Andersen et al. 2020), it was impossible to precisely estimate the scale and global conse-
quences of the COVID-19 disease. At the time orwriting, fourmonths later, even thoughwe are aware of the rate
of loss of human life minimally attributable to the pandemic, precise estimation of the death toll at the end of
the crisis is still out of scientific reach. So is the estimation of its direct and indirect consequences worldwide.
Nonetheless, developing probabilistic scenarios that can reliably inform policy decisions is an important goal.
2.10 This calls for a second important challenge: The COVID-19modelling human behaviour challenge. The com-
plex social dynamics related to transmission, response and compliance (mentioned above) arise from the be-
haviours of individuals. Research in psychology and decision making has recognized for years that humans do
not follow predictable, optimal decision-making even in a laboratory and without deep uncertainty. In times
of crisis, findings suggest that cognition is impaired, and that traumatic experiences can cause psychological
distress and cognitive distortions (Agaibi &Wilson 2005; Liu et al. 2012). A review recently published psycholog-
ical eects of quarantine, including post-traumatic stress symptoms, confusion, and anger (Brooks et al. 2020)
— all factors that have long-lasting consequences on decision making and behaviour, including compliance.
Modelling the complexity of human behaviour, social interaction and the diusion of collective behaviours or
opinions has been at the core of much agent-based modelling (Squazzoni et al. 2014; Flache et al. 2017). Al-
though the incorporation of agents’ heterogeneity in terms of cognitions and behaviours in epidemiological
models is a diicult task and would require cross-disciplinary collaboration (Squazzoni 2010), there are exam-
ples of models using socio-economic data to estimate behavioural heterogeneity in epidemiological diseases
(e.g. Hunter et al. 2017, 2018). Although constructing more complex models takes time and eort, requiring
cross-disciplinary teams andmaybe lowering the rapidity of response to public emergencies, it is nonetheless
necessary to build better models. Indeed, when trying to estimate the consequences of policy measures that
depend on heterogeneous responses, it is oen the case that population outcomes are contingent on specific
sets of circumstances that arise from social interaction and its non-linear eects. Models that cannot examine
the social dynamics of COVID-19 contagion are missing a crucial aspect that has serious implications for any
possible estimation, scenario or prediction. We need to use better informed assumptions of the way in which
individuals’ and communities’ behaviours will change as an eect of the epidemic. Agents are not simply virus
carriers and their preferences and actions have implications at multiple levels.
2.11 This calls for a third important challenge: TheCOVID-19 data calibration and validation challenge. Model val-
idation is very challenging when the model has a predictive purpose. This is because sometimes data are un-
available and/or there are no parallel situations that can be drawn on to to independently test predictive ability
andhence build confidence inmodel findings. During emergencies, experimental samples or testsmight be im-
possible or unethical (Hunter et al. 2017). Without appropriate data, validation can be improved by empirically-
grounded theoretical knowledge and domain competence, which can be the bases for a more adequate rep-
resentation of the complexity of the system. This motivates our plea on the importance of cross-disciplinary
collaboration when simulating epidemiological diseases, which intertwines behavioural, social and economic
dimensions (An et al. 2020). While availability of data is crucial for valid model assumptions, retrospective val-
idation of predictive models is also possible during the unfolding of an event. For instance, Zi & Zi (2020),
using WHO data (World Health Organization 2020), analysed the number of deaths due to COVID-19 and chal-
lenged the assumption of a fixed reproduction rate of the virus, which determines the temporal exponential
growth of the number of infected and deceased. However, fine-tuning parameters of a predictive model via
empirical validation tests during an event, whenmodel predictions inform public decisions on the same event,
can generate confusions.
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2.12 The problem is that the kind of data with the fine-grained quality needed to calibrate and validate COVID-19
models are (if any) dispersed, fragmented and rarely available in a comparable timewindow, scale and format.
All data are subject to biases andCOVID-19-relateddata are no exception. Even the simple task of estimating the
number of COVID-19 cases requires that scientists, decision makers and public refer to the number of persons
who tested positive for the presence of the SARS-CoV-2 virus with sophisticated tests, such as RT-PCR (WHO,
Laboratory testing for COVID-19 in suspected human cases). However, these numbers are dependent not only
on the actual number of infected individuals, but also, for instance, on: the testing capabilities in a given ge-
ographical region, the sensitivity/specificity of a given test, the same definition of ‘cases’, and the willingness
of the testing authority to make undistorted data available (Lai et al. 2020). This is exemplified by the case of
Italy, where the fatality rate is high and unequally distributed because regions have followed dierent testing
approaches, while the health authorities have tested only persons who already have two of three symptoms,
and have never performed random tests. In short, building predictive models based on the number of cases
without considering how cases were defined and data collected can lead to biased estimations. Such obstacles
raise questions about the comparability of available oicial statistics between countries, which are used to es-
timate the number of potential infected in each country. Even if collected and processed with utmost scrutiny,
publicly available data reporting the number of confirmed cases almost certainly greatly underestimates the
number of infected and, consequently, the number of recovered individuals. This fundamental deficiency can
have dramatic calibration/validation consequences if a model aims to predict contagion trends and estimate
the eicacy of policies at various time scales.
The Policy-Modelling Interface
3.1 Theprevious section discussed how the quality of amodel depends on its purpose, its theoretical assumptions,
the level of abstraction, and the quality of data. A further issue is that good COVID-19 pandemicmodels are not
always good policy advice models. For example, a perfect strategy to prevent new infections (e.g. a total shut-
down)mightmean long-term harm to important societal system functions and survival mechanisms. A health-
focussed model concentrating on the process of infection transmission will not automatically provide insights
concerning long-term economic consequences or implications for social well-being, hard though it may seem
to be eectively considering trading o such ramifications against the immediate threat of mortality. In other
words, a particular modelling focus can limit the arena for debate (Aodha & Edmonds 2017).
3.2 Scientific policy advice to inform political debates and decisions about the pandemic should be based on the
empirical monitoring and assessment of social contexts, including ex ante evaluation and appraisal of poten-
tial futures, policy options, and scenarios, as well as on epidemiological models (Weingart & Lentsch 2009;
Wrasai & Swank 2007; Jasano 2004; Weaver et al. 2001). However, the complex characteristics of the social
world generate many possibilities and options. The complexity of social reality refutes a “blueprint for social
engineering on the grand scale” (Popper 1972, p. 267), although the social sciences can teach us much about
empirical regularities in social actions and social systems.
3.3 Computational simulation models generating macro phenomena from micro dynamics have the potential to
provide some expert advice for public policy making (Gilbert et al. 2018; Ahrweiler et al. 2015), especially in ar-
eas where empirical data is scarce or of bad quality, such as in the current outbreak. However, the validity of
scientific policy advice in this domainneeds tobehandledwith care, honesty and responsibility. The limitations
ofmodels and the policy recommendations derived from themhave to be openly communicated and transpar-
ently addressed. This applies not only to recognising missing, insuicient, or bad-quality data for calibrating
andvalidatingmodels, but also toadmitting the fundamental complexities andcontingenciesof social systems,
which require a holistic approach to capture eects of policy measures across the boundaries of sub-systems.
3.4 Under pressure to respond immediately and the social expectations of expert judgement, the temptation is to
turn to simple models with few variables, high predictive claims, and clear messages to policymakers. But,
especially in cases of so-called X-events (i.e. human-caused rare, unexpected events that cause a system to
shi abruptly from one state to another; see Casti 2012, such as pandemic outbreaks, the need for complexity-
appropriate and empirically validated models is higher than ever. Even then, merely creating a good model is
no guarantee that the conclusions that modellers draw from it will be translated into policy.
3.5 One of the problems that arises when translating the conclusions of modelling into policy is managing the po-
tentially fraught relationship between scientific expertise and democratic decisionmaking. There are dierent
functional logics for producing legitimacy in science and in policy, the former internally by peer review and the
latter externally by elections. Trying to bring these two closer together oen ends with a loss of legitimacy for
both: by “politicising science” and by the “scientification of politics” (Weingart 1999). This is complicated by
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the “expert dilemma” (Collins & Evans 2007), that it is usually rather easy for every political position to find an
expert willing to provide scientific evidence to support their own position, leading to competing expertise sets.
This can lead to scientific advice being treated asmerely symbolic or rhetorical as it can be observed in the cur-
rent COVID-19 public and media discourse, where experts seem more oen to be asked to legitimise political
decisions.
3.6 Modelling and simulation can remedy someof these issues by providing support for “evidence-based policy” (a
term from themid-nineties in the wake of the evidence-basedmedicine approach) (Pawson 2006). As outlined
inGilbert et al. (2018), forpolicyevaluationweneeddataabout theactual situationwith thepolicy implemented
to compare with data about the situation if the policy were not implemented. To obtain the latter, randomized
controlled trials (RCTs) have been seen as the “gold standard”, as they are in evidence-based medicine. How-
ever, RCTs in policy contexts are oen diicult and expensive to organise, and are sometimes not feasible, for
examplewhen the policy is available to all and so there is no possible control group, or even ethical. Simulation
models can be used to create virtual worlds, onewith and onewithout the implementation of the policy, to ob-
tain an evidence base to inform “knowledge-based policy” (Gilbert et al. 2018) — they can explicitly represent
(and hence make available for critique) a “theory of change” that can tell us when the results of an RCT can be
applied to a dierent context (Cartwright & Hardie 2012).
3.7 Asecondareaofdiiculty inmanaging themodelling-policy interface is a still prevalent conceptualisationof the
relationship between science and policy that marginalises the expertise of professionals and other stakehold-
ers. There are many theories about the role of scientific policy advice: decisionistic, technocratic, pragmatic,
or recursive (Lentsch & Weingart 2011). However, all of these assume that scientific elites interact directly only
with political elites.
3.8 The current situation around COVID-19 shows howmany diverse stakeholder interests are involved in shaping
the implementation of knowledge-based policy agendas. Problem solutions require behaviour change on a
global scale, changes to societal routines and practices, and new approaches to economic organisation and
social well-being. Thus, policy agendas are big societal projects that, to be eective, have to be supported by
all members of society building on their knowledge, experience and expertise. Agendas, and the underlying
models supporting these agendas, must be informed not only by the elites, but by all relevant stakeholders
and practitioners if they are to be successful and sustainable.
3.9 In our “experimental societies” (Gross & Krohn 2005), where experimentation, manipulations and policies are
ubiquitous and generate reflexivity and performativity of outcomes, it is diicult learn how to coordinate trans-
formation processes around global challenges such as COVID-19 in a participativeway. However, in complexity-
based realistic modelling and simulation, there is already an emerging awareness of how to integrate stake-
holder interests and expertise. Involving stakeholders in policy andmanagementmodelling activities has been
extensively applied in socio-ecologicalmanagement (Jones et al. 2009;Mendoza&Prabhu 2006; Robles-Morua
et al. 2014). An example of doing so is the “Companion Modelling” framework (Barreteau et al. 2003; Étienne
2013).
3.10 Although policy modelling for policy advice shares the complexity of the target (Geyer & Cairney 2015), it can
be also seen as a straightforward service activity with policymakers and policy analysts as clients who contract
modellers under demanding budget and time restrictions (Ahrweiler et al. 2019). Usually a high immediate util-
ity of results and short deadlines aremandatory requirements of any policy advice project using computational
models (e.g. Aodha & Edmonds 2017). This requires a lean and systematic process among modellers and poli-
cymakers to develop appropriate support to help stakeholders and policy actors engage with and benefit from
those with modelling and assessment expertise by establishing a set of resources to help both sides negotiate
the relationship (e.g. Jager & Edmonds 2015).
3.11 An important part of this eort will be to improve the interface between modellers and policymakers, recog-
nising the requirements of each. From the perspective of a policymaker, advice needs to be specific, concise,
relevant to their immediate concerns, and accompanied by a plausible narrative. From the point of view of a
modeller, advice needs to recognize the inherent uncertainty of conclusions drawn from the model, and avoid
oversimplification. Both modellers and policymakers need to accept that ‘evidence’, no matter how strong, is
just one ingredient in political decision-making, to bemixed in with others such as political expediency, public
opinion, practicality, and so on.
3.12 Involvingpolicymakers at the very earliest stagesofmodelling (that is, ‘co-design’) canhelp, bygivingmodellers
a tacit understanding of the policymaking context, and policymakers a feel for the uncertainties and assump-
tions that are unavoidable in policy modelling. An alternative is to encourage the use of “knowledge brokers”,
that is peoplewho can bridge the gap betweenmodelling and policymaking, preferably drawing on experience
of both. Independent ‘think tanks’ and analytic divisions within government can oen perform such a role.
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3.13 In addition, modellers can make their models more useful for informing policy, for example, by ensuring that
updating amodel with newdata can be done easily and quickly (as is done inweather forecasting, for example,
see Kalnay 2003. For COVID-19models, thiswouldmean that their calibrationwould be updated, perhaps daily,
to assimilate the latest infection andmortality data. If appropriate, models can also be adapted to become the
basis for ‘serious games’ (Cannon-Bowers 2010; Zhou 2014), in which stakeholders can interact with the model
and explore the implications of policy options.
3.14 Modellers also need to be prepared for their advice to fall on deaf ears if the policy issues are not salient at
the time— policy advice is most influential during ‘windows of opportunity’ (Kingdon & Stano 1984), moments
when there is coincidence of policy interest, possible solutions and implementation opportunities. They also
need to understand that policy making is itself a political process, in which advocacy coalitions compete for
influence and may set the ‘framing’ for an issue. Such framing can heavily influence the search for relevant
evidence. For example, it can influence the design of a computational model and the choice of policy options
to be examined. As noted above,modelling requiresmaking decisions onmatters such as the boundaries of the
domain to bemodelled, the degree of abstraction, the theory of change implied by themodel, the assumptions
about unmeasurable parameters and so on. These decisions are oenmade implicitly, based on the designer’s
or policy maker’s framing of the policy issue. A danger is that a dominant coalition with an accepted model
can use it to support their policy for long periods, simply updating the model over time, while leaving its basic
assumptions unchanged (Kolkman et al. 2016).
A Call to Action
4.1 Our community has made considerable progress in improving the methodological rigour and transparency of
agent-based modelling, with a special attention to model documentation and sharing for replicability. The es-
tablishment of CoMSES (an online clearinghouse for model codes and documentation), initiatives such as the
Open Modelling Foundation, and journal policies to enforce the adoption of open science principles have pro-
vided relevant infrastructures to the field that have improved assessment and replicability. Defending these
principles and practices is necessary in normal times; it is even more vital in periods of public pressures and
political uncertainty. Firstly, a lack of rigorous cross-checks by experts on models could have serious conse-
quences if findings that inform public decisions turn out to be based on brittle assumptions or simply contain
mistakes. This could reverberate on the reputationof thewhole community. Secondly, whenmultiple academic
teams build their models from scratch without incrementally developing previously assessed models, there is
a risk of research waste andmisallocation of resources.
4.2 Given that exceptional times require exceptional responses, we call here for: (A) thewhole community of agent-
based modellers and computational social scientists working on COVID-19 models to collaborate inmaintain-
ing high standards of model building and committing to best practices of transparency and rigour for
replicability; (B) the institutional agencies, which have data that could help calibrate and inform COVID-19
models at various national, regional, local levels of granularity to engage themost trusted scientific associa-
tions in setting up data infrastructures in order tomake data available to the academic communitywhile
protecting stakeholders’ interests.
4.3 As regards to (A), although competition and timely publication of results are essential to the advancement of
science, theneed for immediate responses in exceptional times and the availability of onlineplatforms for rapid
sharing of results (i.e., preprint online archives, social media) must not compromise the rigorous methodolog-
ical standards that are essential for the long-term sustainability of the scientific enterprise.
4.4 There is widespread consensus in the community of agent-based modellers on three best practices: (1) using
open source soware and tools (e.g., NetLogo, MASON) to build models to minimize obstacles to replication
and eective access costs for reviewers and possible re-users; (2) adopting standard protocols to document
models that make easier for reviewers and re-users to assess model properties and building blocks, while al-
lowing model builders to reflect on the adequacy of their model’s structure and features (Edmonds et al. 2019;
Grimm et al. 2020); and (3) using permanent online repositories, such as ComSES, to archive fully documented
models before submission of a paper to a journal to speed up assessment and replicability. We believe that
these three practices are all the more important during exceptional times: what the community loses in terms
of immediate rapidity of responses to public expectations as a result of complying with these best practices is
gained in enhancing its long-term credibility.
4.5 As regards to (B), although immediate sharing of institutional data to help scholars develop more empirically
contextualized and customizedmodels is a good idea, the kind of data that is necessary to calibrate model pa-
rameters and estimate outcomes could require appropriate infrastructures to ensure that sensitive information
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is properly treated. While relevant benefits are expected when institutions outsource research to the commu-
nity on a large scale via data sharing, there are alternatives that could make this eort manageable in a more
responsible way so that the advantages of transparency and open data can be counterbalanced with the pri-
ority of protection and security. Benchmarks exist to build customized protocols for data sharing that could
be adapted to the purpose of sharing institutional data for agent-based computational research on COVID-19
(e.g. Squazzoni et al. 2020). However, this process needs a clear organisation and representative authorities
capable of ensuring transparent rules of access and enforcing public interest of data use. In this regard, The Eu-
ropean Social Simulation Association (ESSA), the largest association for the advancement of social simulation
research worldwide, and the Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation (JASSS), the flagship journal of
the community of agent-basedmodellers, established in 1998, have agreed to oer their expertise and facilities
to manage this process in the benefit of institutional stakeholders and the community.
4.6 ESSA commits itself to set up a protocol for data sharing that will be jointly developed with any institutional
agency interested in sharing data for research. While the association has membership fees and priorities re-
lated to strengthening the European research area, its international dimension and publicmandatewill help to
ensure that any interested teams of scholars independently of their origin and status will have the opportunity
of data access through public calls. Public calls will target only interdisciplinary teams formed by at least epi-
demiologists, computer scientists, and social and behavioural scientists. The Association also commits itself to
opening a campaign to leverage funds anddonations to support this eortwhenever a first institutional agency
accepts to collaborate. JASSS commits itself to enforce its policy on transparency andmodel documentation by
collaboratingwith CoMSES to streamline peer reviewofmodel codes of anymanuscript on COVID-19 submitted
to the journal. This will ensure that code reviewers andmanuscript reviewers will bemutually informed so that
competences and resources will be optimized.
4.7 Exceptional times require exceptional decisions and these may benefit from collective creativity. While atten-
tion is now focussed on immediate epidemiological challenges, the decisions of many governments to con-
tain the pandemic are already having unpredictable consequences on social behaviour, social relationships,
economic processes, political agendas, and the mental health of millions of individuals. Research will also be
needed to understand these long-term consequences, which could turn out to be dramatic beyond the imme-
diate public health sphere. Our call for action is an attempt to organise a sustainable collaborative answer to
these long-term socio-economic challenges. We praise current initiatives from prestigious institutions, such as
the Royal Society and some funding agencies, to stimulate and support modelling research to address impor-
tant challenges. ESSA and JASSS are here to help.
Appendix
Edmonds et al. (2019) listed seven modelling purposes: prediction, explanation, description, theoretical expo-
sition, illustration, social learning, and analogy. Prediction, not to be confused with ‘what my model outputs,’
entails reliable anticipation of unknown data or knowledge. Explanation is the attempt to provide a possible
causal chain from initialization to output that shows why or how a phenomenon of interest could occur. De-
scription is a partial representation of a specific case study of interest, with no claim to generality beyond that.
Theoretical exposition is when simulations are used to explore general theories or ideas, without any neces-
sary connection to the real world. Illustration involves using a simulation to communicate an idea. Analogy is
a more informal kind of use of a simulation than theoretical exposition used to help think through ideas in a
playful and creative way. Social learning is the use of simulation to represent the shared knowledge of a group.
Here, in Table 1, we tried to consider eachof thesepurposeswith a view toevaluating the role the corresponding
models might play in a crisis context, the potential usefulness they might have to decision-makers, and risks
associated with their use (many of which are general to all models, not just agent-basedmodels).
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Purpose Value in a crisis context Usefulness to decision-makers Risks
Prediction Ability to anticipate and com-
pare intervention scenarios (in-
cluding the consequences of do-
ing nothing). Assessment of un-
certainties, and development of
‘robust’ policies that minimize
maximumregret. Base linenum-
bers to use in planning.
If answers to questions can be
derived quickly enough, and
interventions formalized accu-
rately, it could make a valuable
contribution to discussion over
interventions.
Over-relianceon themodel as an
‘oracle’, inappropriate political
exposure of developers, inabil-
ity of an eectiveness-focused
model to forecast policy util-
ity. Oen, the quality of data
to calibrate importantmodel pa-
rameters is questionable, espe-
cially during an event. It is
alsonotnecessarily thecase that
decision-makers will adopt the
policy the model recommends.
Explanation Explanation could address ques-
tions such as how we (might
have) arrived at a particular out-
come, but does not guarantee
that the particular causal chain
that really led us there is the one
simulated.
More likely of use in ‘lessons
learned’ exercises, especially if
in conjunctionwith several other
models with a similar purpose.
Enacting measures that address
possible causes rather than the
actual causes risks unintended
consequences in future.
Description A descriptive model could be
used to explore scenarios in a
heavily constrained context.
Unlikely to be of value at the
national scale, in part because
the generalizations needed to
model at that scale would be
inconsistent with this modelling
purpose. Could be used for local
levels, however.
Elements not simulated might
prove later to be relevant. Over-
generalization from a model fit-
ted to specific circumstances is




Potentially valuable in resolv-
ing conflict. The main value is
the process by which the model
is constructed, rather than the
model itself.
Resolving arguments, encourag-
ing people to see others’ points
of view, observing the logical
consequences of beliefs.
Modelling what people in a
group believe does not guar-
antee relevance beyond the
group, or to the empirical world.
Usual risks of group-work (e.g.
groupthink, dominant voices)
need to be carefully managed
by facilitators.
Illustration Useful for communication and
education of ideas to the general
public.
Provides a means of communi-
cating reasoning behind policies
for dealing with the crisis that
may be unpopular
Under certain conditions, the
model may not behave consis-




Unlikely to be of value. In a crisis context, decision-
makers will have little time
for comparing or exploring
theories.
No (necessary) connection with
the real world in this purpose
risks over interpretation if at-
tempt is made to use it.
Analogy Of little valueother thandistract-
ing the modellers themselves
from the psychological conse-
quences of the crisis.
Not useful. Over interpretation of findings
that merit more rigorous study
using, say, theoretical exposi-
tion or explanation purposes.
Table 1: A taxonomy of modelling purposes, value, usefulness and risks during a crisis (adapted from Edmonds
et al. 2019).
Notes
1For an account see The Washington Post by William Booth on March 17, 2020:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/a-chilling-scientific-paper-helped-upend-us-and-uk-coronavirus-
strategies/2020/03/17/aaa84116-6851-11ea-b199-3a9799c54512_story.html.
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2At the time of publication the team have announced they will release the code, but the final date and form
are not yet clear.
3This is the tweet by Neil Ferguson on 22 March, 2020, 10:13PM: “I’m conscious that lots of people would
like to see and run the pandemic simulation codewe are using tomodel controlmeasures against COVID-19. To
explain the background — I wrote the code (thousands of lines of undocumented C) 13+ years ago to model flu
pandemics. . .”.
4For instance, see Smaldino’s social distancing model (http://smaldino.com/wp/covid-19-modeling-the--
flattening-of-the-curve/), aNetLogomodelwhich illustrateshowsocial distancing flattens the infection curve. It
is interesting to note that inmid-March, a simulationmodel of a non-existent disease “simulitis” in an imaginary
populationwaspublishedasan interactiveonlinegraphicby theWashingtonPost (see: https://www.washington-
post.com/graphics/2020/world/corona-simulator/). The model sparked a broad societal debate on social dis-
tancing. The model was timely and openly accessible for the public. Its purpose was to illustrate the possible
consequences of an (unsuccessful) lock-down and of social distancing on flattening the curve of population
contagion. The exact ‘decision rules’ were unclear in the article, but the build-up of the storyline, from indi-
viduals getting infected to limiting movement of individuals, was extremely clear. In this model, people were
susceptible, sick or recovered. There was no explicit implementation of mortality due to an editorial decision
by the newspaper, deeming death to be too cruel for its readers.
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